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Abstract: 
 
7KLVSDSHULVDQLQWURGXFWRU\H[SORUDWLRQRIWKHQRWLRQRIµIRUPVRIOLIH¶ LQ WKHODWHU
SKLORVRSK\ RI /XGZLJ :LWWJHQVWHLQ 7KH QRWLRQ RI µIRUPV RI OLIH¶ LV FHQWUDO WR
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VODWHUSKLORVRSK\(YHQWKRXJKWKLVLVWKHFDVHWKHUHKDYH
bHHQ D YDULHW\ RI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI WKLV QRWLRQ LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH RQ :LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V
thought,QSDUWWKLVLVGXHWR:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VLQIUHTXHQWUHIHUHQFHWRµIRUPVRIOLIH¶. The 
WHUP µIRUP RI OLIH¶ RQO\ DSSHDUV ILYH WLPHV LQ WKH Philosophical Investigations, the 
FHQWUDOWH[WRI:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VODWHUSKLORVRSK\,WLVDSRLQWRIGHEDWHZKHWKHUWKHQRWLRQ
RIµIRUPVRIOLIH¶FRPPLWV:LWWJHQVWHLQWRDIRUPRIUHODWLYLVP7KLVSDSHUH[SORUHVWKLV
problem. We argue that it is entirely possible for members of different conceptual 
FRPPXQLWLHVWRHQJDJHLQGLDORJXHZLWKHDFKRWKHURQ:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VYLHZ:HDUJXH
that Wittgenstein was not a cognitive relativist:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VFRQYLFWLRQZDVWKDWWUXWK
is bound to this complicated form of life, or the fundamentally human perspective. His 
view of truth remains perspectival. Members of different conceptual communities can 
HQWHULQWRGLDORJXH2WKHUµIRUPVRIOLIH¶DUHDYDLODEOHWR³XV´DQGPHPEHUVRIGLYHUVH
groups can change their views.  
 
 
Text:  
 
7KH QRWLRQ RI D µIRUP RI OLIH¶ LV FHQWUDO WR DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DQG DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI
:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VODWHUSKLORVRSK\,QGHHGWKLVFRQFHSWLVWKHXOWLPDWHJURXQGIURPZKLFK
any discussion of central concepts such as meaning and use, rules and knowledge take 
their point of departure. Yet, tKH WHUP µIRUP RI OLIH¶ DSSHDUV RQO\ ILYH WLPHV LQ WKH
Philosophical Investigations:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VVHFRQGPDVWHUSLHFH, and this infrequency 
lends weight to a non-technical reading. In fact, the notion of a µIRUP RI OLIH¶ PD\
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capture the general RULHQWDWLRQRI:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VODWHUWKRXJKWUDWKHUWKDQUHSUHVHQWD
VSHFLILFDOO\µWHFKQLFDO¶WHUPLQDQDUURZVHQVHIt is a point of contention whether this 
QRWLRQRURULHQWDWLRQRIµIRUPVRIOLIH¶XOWLPDWHO\FRPPLWV:LWWJHQVWHLQWRDIRUPRI
relativism. Relativism is not one single doctrine but rather a collection of views about 
the nature of thought, reality and experience and is generally problematic. Here, I will 
introduce WKHQRWLRQRIµIRUPVRI OLIH¶ LQ:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VSKLORVRSK\DQG , will raise, 
without resolving, the problem of relativism in two of its forms: cultural relativism and 
cognitive relativism. 
 
7KHQRWLRQRIµIRUPVRIOLIH¶LVSULPRUGLDOIRU:LWWJHQVWHLQHe says: 
 
What has to be accepted, the given, is ± so one could say ± forms of life 
(Wittgenstein 1953: 226e). 
 
By the time Wittgenstein wrote the Philosophical Investigations he had come to see 
ODQJXDJHDVPDGHXSRIDPXOWLSOLFLW\RIµODQJXDJHJDPHV¶DQGWKHPRWLIRIµODQJXDJH
JDPHV¶ LV FHQWUDOO\ LPSRUWDQW WR XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH QRWLRQ RI µIRUPV RI OLIH¶ For 
Wittgenstein, words cannot be understood in isolation from the context in which they 
DUHXVHG7KLVLVVRVLQFHµWKHPHDQLQJRIDZRUGLVLWVXVHLQWKHODQJXDJH¶:LWWJHQVWHLQ
1953: 20e). The way to grasp the meaning of a word is to observe its use in the 
µODQJXDJHJDPH¶LQZKLFKLWLVXVHG'RLQJVRHQDEOHVWKHREVHUYHUWRVHHKRZWKDWZRUG
is deployed by individuals in the communal activity of their linguistic community. In 
order to grasp the meaning of a word in any given context it is necessary to pay attention 
to the various non-linguistic activities and practices engaged in by that group; since it 
is within this context that any given language is used and any given language will be 
interwoven with such activities and practices. It is the use of words together with these 
non-OLQJXLVWLFDFWLYLWLHVWKDWPDNHXSµODQJXDJHJDPHV¶. Speaking a language is part of 
an activity and so of a form of life. 
 
Like games, speaking is a rule-guided activity wherein behaving and acting in certain 
ways is tantamount to grasping the rule. If they are to be grasped at all then language 
games must be grasped in terms of the context wherein they are played. As Bernard 
Williams put the point some time ago, ODQJXDJH RQ :LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V YLHZ is an 
µHPERGLHG WKLV-ZRUOGO\ FRQFUHWH VRFLDO DFWLYLW\ H[SUHVVLYH RI KXPDQ QHHGV¶
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(Williams 1981: 147). Language games are embedded in a form of life. A form of life 
is the bedrock or given. It is the irreducible basis for any inquiry into language and, as 
Wittgenstein says, µWR LPDJLQH D ODQJXDJH PHDQV WR LPDJLQH D IRUP RI OLIH¶
(Wittgenstein 1953: 8e). In :LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V Blue and Brown Books the concept of 
language is equated with the concept of culture: (Wittgenstein 1958: 134). A culture is 
the µWRWDOLW\RIFRPPXQDODFWLYLWLHVLQWRZKLFKODQJXDJH-JDPHVDUHHPEHGGHG¶*ORFN
1996: 125). In so far as language has any foundation at all this foundation is not 
something abstract. Its foundation is communal activity itself. 
 
Wittgenstein described KLVWDVNDVWKDWRIVXSSO\LQJµUHPDUNVRQWKHQDWXUDOKLVWRU\RI
KXPDQEHLQJV¶:LWWJHQVWHLQHHis view is that linguistic behaviour is as 
much a part of human evolution as walking, eating and drinking (Wittgenstein 1953: 
12e). Nevertheless, WKH WHUP µIRUP RI OLIH¶ FDQQRW EH UHGXFHG WR biology. Nor is it 
equivalent to the concept of µhuman nature¶. Instead, Wittgenstein placed his emphasis 
RQKXPDQLW\¶VKLVWRULFDOSUDFWLFH:LWWJHQVWHLQH7KHa priori concepts under 
which experience is brought and ultimately made intelligible are generated within a 
given historical epoch in light of the concerns and needs of actual human agents. 
Concepts are historical and depend upon education and training and this takes place in 
language games (Wittgenstein 1967: 68). 
 
Now, I KDYHVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHQRWLRQRIµIRUPVRIOLIH¶SRVHVWKHTXHVWLRQRIUHODWLYLVP
LanguaJH JDPHV IRU :LWWJHQVWHLQ DUH D JURXS¶V RU D FRPPXQLW\¶V PHWKRG RI
representation (Wittgenstein 1953: 25e). Given the fact that concepts are generated over 
time through training and education and that once these concepts are in place the way 
WKLQJV µORRN WR XV¶ ZLOO EH D FHUWDLQ ZD\ LW IROORZV WKDW KDG ZH formed different 
concepts the way things look to us might have been quite different. The way we see 
things ultimately depends upon our language since our language is the means by which 
we manage to represent the data of experience. Individuals who make up a shared 
OLQJXLVWLF FRPPXQLW\ PXVW E\ YLUWXH RI WKHLU FRQFHSWV DQG µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO IRUP¶
generally agree in their judgements about the nature of things. This agreement depends 
upon individuals being pDUWRIDVKDUHGµIRUPRIOLIH¶ 
 
If language is to be a means of communication and if an individual can function within 
a language, then they must be able to understand their utterances and their 
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representations as well as understanding the way in which the group more generally 
understands and represents things. The issue of relativism arises when we consider the 
LGHDRIDSOXUDOLW\RIµIRUPVRIOLIH¶HDFKZLWKWKHLURZQGLVWLQFWDQGPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYH
µZD\VRIVHHLQJ¶WKHZRUOG,WLVSRVVLEOHWRGLVWLQJuish two kinds of relativism: cultural 
and cognitive relativism. If we isolate these as two distinct theses we can characterise 
them as follows: cultural relativism is the view that there are differences between 
different cultures or in the history of one particular culture with regards to social, moral 
and religious values and practices. Cognitive relativism is the view that there are 
GLIIHUHQWZD\VRIµVHHLQJWKHZRUOG¶WKDWLVWKDWWKHUHLVDSOXUDOLW\RIGLIIHUHQWVHWVRI
categories under which experience is organised and the world understood. Each set of 
categories is held to be internally consistent and exclusive. The upshot of cognitive 
relativism is that the individuals belonging to one conceptual community will be unable 
to grasp at all what it is like to be a member of another community. If cognitive 
relativism is true, then WKH µWUXWK¶ WKDW D SDUWLFXODU JURXS WDON RI NQRZLQJ ZRXld 
XOWLPDWHO\EHµWKHLUWUXWK¶ 
 
5HJDUGLQJ:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V QRWLRQRIµIRUPVRIOLIH¶WKHGLYLVLRQRIUHODWLYLVPLQWRWKH 
FXOWXUDODQGFRJQLWLYHVWUDQGVLVSUREOHPDWLF7KHQRWLRQRIDµIRUPRIOLIH¶LVLQWHQGHG
to stress that language is imbued with cultural concerns and vice versa. For 
Wittgenstein, it is impossLEOH WR VHSDUDWHDFRPPXQLW\¶VFXOWXUDO practice from their 
liQJXLVWLF SUDFWLFH DQG XOWLPDWHO\ WKHLU µEHLQJ VR PLQGHG¶ 7KH µIRUP RI OLIH¶ WKDW
individuals share encompasses the concepts that they organise the world into, and the 
language they use to communicate, as well as their cultural practices and values and so 
if Wittgenstein is a relativist he has to be a relativist on both the cultural and cognitive 
counts. 
 
It is possible to read Wittgenstein as a relativist. It is what individuals utter and assert 
in language that is true and false. Now, Wittgenstein asserts that when a proposition or 
judgement is deemed true or false this does not amount to a true or false claim about 
the nature of reality. Rather, LWDPRXQWVWRDJUHHPHQWLQµIRUPRIOLIH¶7KLVVXJJHVWV
WKDWGLIIHUHQWµIRUPVRIOLIH¶KDYHGLIIHUHQWµZD\VRI VHHLQJ¶WKHZRUOG and this might 
imply a multiplicity of different standards of truth and falsity. This reading is supported 
E\VRPHRI:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VUHPDUNV)RUH[DPSOHZKHQKHVD\Vµ,IDOLRQFRXOGWDON
ZHFRXOGQRWXQGHUVWDQGKLP¶ :LWWJHQVWHLQH DQG µ:HGRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQG
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Chinese gestures any more than Chinese sentences¶ :LWWJHQVWHLQ   6XFK 
UHPDUNVVXJJHVWDSOXUDOLW\RIµIRUPVRIOLIH¶DQGUHODWLYLVPEHWZHHQthem. Wittgenstein 
also suggests that when language games change so to do concepts and the meanings of 
words (Wittgenstein 1969: 10e). 
 
The problem with a relativist position is that it entails the view that all truth must be 
truth-in-a-form-of-life. The result is that there is no standard to tell ZKLFKµIRUPRIOLIH¶
has the µWUXHU¶YLHZRIWKLQJV6XFKDSRVLWLRQLVLQFRKHUHQWEHFDXVHLWLQYRNHVDQRQ-
relativistic sense of truth to characterise a relativistic state of affairs while 
simultaneously denying the existence of non-relativistic truth (Lear 1983: 55). So, the 
relatiYLVWV¶SRVLWLRQ is ultimately self-refuting. It claims to be true in a way that it itself 
UHMHFWV,IWKLVLV:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VSRVLWLRQ, then his later philosophy would be incoherent. 
If relativism is true, WKHQWKHUHFDQEHQRWUXWKRWKHUWKDQµWUXWKLQDWKHRU\¶and it follows 
from this that the propositions of physics and chemistry and so on are only true relative 
WRRXUVFLHQWLILFµIRUPRIOLIH¶ 
 
There is another related problem with relativism for Wittgenstein. If we hold that there 
LVPRUHWKDQRQHµIRUPRIOLIH¶WKHSUHPLVHRIUHODWLYLVPWKHQKRZZRXOGLQGLYLGXDOV
LQRQHµIRUPRIOLIH¶EHDEOHWRUHFRJQLVHDQRWKHUµIRUPRIOLIH¶as DQRWKHUµIRUPRIOLIH¶"
7REHDEOHWRGLVWLQJXLVKDQRWKHUµIRUPRIOLIH¶WKHUHPXVWEHVRPHPHDQVWRLGHQWLI\LW
and to distinguish it as D µIRUP RI OLIH¶ ,I WKH RWKHU µIRUP RI OLIH¶ LV FRJQLWLYHO\
inaccessible to us, then we would not be able to regard LWDVDµIRUPRIOLIH¶DQGZH
would be unable to interpret the practices that constitute it. If the lion spoke and we did 
not understand him, we would not be entitled to say that it was a member of another 
µIRUPRIOLIH¶. Our failure to understand would just show XSRXUµIRUPRIOLIH¶V¶OLPLWV
of intelligibility. 
 
There is, however, one qualification that should be made before moving on. This is that 
while Wittgenstein could be a conceptual relativist he cannot be a philosophical 
relativist (Glock 1996: 127). When Wittgenstein uses the terms that he does he is not 
DSSO\LQJ WKHP LQ ZD\V WKDW DUH OLPLWHG WR RQH µODQJXDJH JDPH¶ only. Quite often 
:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VUHPDUNs are intended to point our attention to the way in which a word 
is used in a SDUWLFXODUµODQJXDJHJDPH¶His remark is intended to be true in a way that 
WUDQVFHQGVDQ\SDUWLFXODUSUDFWLFHRUµIRUPRIOLIH¶MDQ\RI:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VUHPDUNVDUH
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µJUDPPDWLFDO¶ in this sense. If it is possible to make remarks that transcend different 
practices, then it must be possible to acknowledge the existence of other practices or 
µIRUPVRIOLIH¶SXFKµIRUPVRIOLIH¶must be cognitively accessible to us. Other world-
YLHZV µZD\V RI VHHLQJ¶ RU µIRUPV RI OLIH¶ DUH QRW LPDJLQDWLYHO\ XQLQWHOOLJLEOH to 
LQGLYLGXDOV IURP GLIIHUHQW µIRUPV RI OLIH¶ IRU :LWWJHQVWHLQ ,QGHHG Wittgenstein 
encouraged this kind of imagination. µ/LIHUXQs on GLIIHUHQWO\¶ in different µIRUPVRI
OLIH¶and our imagination can travel amongst them. 
 
Interesting in this regard are VRPHRI:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VUHPDUNVRQ the anthropologist J.G. 
)UD]HU¶VGolden Bough:LWWJHQVWHLQFRPSODLQVµ:KDWQDUURZQHVVRIVSLULWXDOOife we 
find in Frazer! And as a result: how impossible for him to understand a different way 
of life from the English one of his time! Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not 
EDVLFDOO\ DQ (QJOLVK SDUVRQ RI RXU WLPHV ZLWK DOO KLV VWXSLGLW\ DQG IHHEOHQHVV¶ 
(Wittgenstein 1979: 5e). Rather than accept such an unimaginative anthropology 
WittgenstHLQ LQVLVWV WKDW µZH¶ can imagine situations and practices that are quite 
different from our own. He also insists that when we consider the performance of, for 
example, a horrific rite, ceremony or festival, and feel affected by it, we grasp the 
concern or mood that gave rise to it in the first place. He says: µZKDW VWULNHV XV
LQ«>WKH@«FRXUVHRIHYHQWVDVWHUULEOHLPSUHVVLYHKRUULEOHWUDJLF	FDQ\-thing but 
trivial and insignificant, that is what gave birth to WKHP¶ (Wittgenstein 1979: 3e). 
Outsiders can, as it were, achieve somethLQJ RI DQ LQVLGHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH. More 
IXQGDPHQWDO WKDQ DQ\RQHSDUWLFXODU µIRUPRI OLIH¶ WKDW LQGLYLGXDOV FRQVWLWXWH LV this 
complicated form of life; and that is, the fundamentally human perspective. It is entirely 
possible that individuals with different concerns than ours may classify and categorise 
the world differently in light of their interests and needs. 
 
What is essential is that for Wittgenstein, WKHVHGLIIHUHQWZD\VRIµVHHLQJ¶WKHZRUOGDUH 
not cognitively inaccessible to one another. He says: 
 
I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances and been 
taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, and therefore believed this. 
:HPLJKWLQVWUXFWKLPWKHHDUWKKDVORQJ«HWF± We should be trying to give 
him our picture of the world. This would happen through a kind of persuasion 
(Wittgenstein 1969: 34e). 
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This remark is crucial when it is considered against the notion of a plurality of different 
µZD\VRIVHHLQJ¶WKHZRUOGEvery view of the world is equally significant (Wittgenstein 
1979: 11e) and cRQYLQFLQJ PHPEHUV RI RQH µIRUP RI OLIH¶ RI WKH XQVXLWDELOLW\
inadequacy or irrationality and so on of their view of things cannot only be a matter of 
rational argument but must be a matter of persuasion EHWZHHQ µIRUPV RI OLIH¶. The 
LQGLYLGXDOVZKRFRQVWLWXWHWKHµIRUPRIOLIH¶WKDWHQJDJHVLQFKLOGVDFULILFHLQRUGHUWR
appease a vengeful god and secure a plentiful harvest cannot be deflected from that 
view and practice simply by placing a rational argument to the effect that there is no 
causal link between their sacrifice and the success of the farming season. It may well 
DSSHDUWRPHPEHUVRIDVFLHQWLILFµUDWLRQDO¶µIRUPRIOLIH¶WKDWWKHLUSUDFWLFHLVLUUDWLRQDO
and based on false beliefs. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein is firm in holding that convincing 
WKHPHPEHUVRIWKDWµIRUPRIOLIH¶FDQRQO\EHDPDWWHURISHUVXDVLRQ. It is not just a 
matter of presenting cold facts about their false beliefs. 
 
In fact, Wittgenstein was sceptical that phenomena, such as child sacrifice or whatever, 
came about as a result of false beliefs about the world. He says: 
 
LWLVQRQVHQVHLIZH«VD\WKDWWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFIHDWXUHRIthese actions is that 
WKH\ VSULQJ IURP ZURQJ LGHDV DERXW WKH SK\VLFV RI WKLQJV«:KDW PDNHV WKH
character of ritual action is not any view or opinion, either right or ZURQJ«
(Wittgenstein 1979: 7e). 
 
We cannot observe a practice and diagnose it as springing from false beliefs since we 
FDQ RQO\ HYHU GHVFULEH LW DQG VD\ µKXPDQ OLIH LV OLNH WKDW¶ :LWWJHQVWHLQ  H
Precisely how this description would be carried out is an interesting question. This 
emphasis on description potentially allies Wittgenstein with the projects of 
phenomenological philosophers (such as Heidegger) and with the pathos of some 
existential philosophies. 3HUVXDVLRQLVWKHRQO\PHDQVRSHQWRPHPEHUVRIRQHµIRUP
RIOLIH¶LQFRPEDWLQJZKDWWKH\SHUFeive as wrong-headed practices. 
 
Dialogue, persuasion, self-awareness and humility are the order of the day for 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was not a cognitive relativist but his view of truth remains 
perspectival. Members of different conceptual communities can enter into dialogue and 
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revise their perspective. If they do so, they may take over the views of another 
perspective but there is no recourse to a non-humaQ*RG¶VH\HYLHZRQ WKLQJV7KH
TXHVWLRQRIµWKHQDWXUHRIWUXWK¶IRU:LWWJHQVWHLQVKRXOGEHSRVHGLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIWKH
question of cognitive relativism. His conviction was that truth is ultimately rooted in 
what people say and the views that they have on things, and, ultimately, to this 
complicated form of life, which is the fundamentally human perspective. 
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